The Station Nightclub Fire and Federal Jurisdictional Reach: The Multidistrict, Multiparty, Multiforum Jurisdiction Act of 2002 by Adomeit, Peter
Western New England University School of Law
Digital Commons @ Western New England University School of
Law
Faculty Scholarship Faculty Publications
2003
The Station Nightclub Fire and Federal
Jurisdictional Reach: The Multidistrict, Multiparty,
Multiforum Jurisdiction Act of 2002
Peter Adomeit
Western New England University School of Law, padomeit@law.wne.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/facschol
Part of the Civil Procedure Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Digital Commons @ Western New England University School of
Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Western New England University
School of Law. For more information, please contact pnewcombe@law.wne.edu.
Recommended Citation
25 W. New Eng. L. Rev. 243 (2003)
ARTICLE 

THE STATION NIGHTCLUB FIRE AND 

FEDERAL JURISDICTIONAL REACH: 









The fourth worst nightclub fire3 in American history occurred 
on February 20, 2003, in West Warwick, Rhode Island at The Sta­
tion nightclub during a rock concert by the California-based heavy 
metal band "Great White,"4 a few weeks after the effective dateS of 
1. Pub. L. No. 107-273, § 11020, 116 Stat. 1758 (2002). It is part of the 21st 
Century Department of Justice Appropriations Authorization Act. 
2. Professor of Law, Western New England College School of Law. Professor 
Adomeit teaches Civil Procedure and Labor Law. He is a member of the National 
Academy of Arbitrators. He also has served as a Special Master in discovery matters in 
Federal Court. 
3. The others were Boston, Massachusetts, 1942-"the Coconut Grove fire"­
(491 killed); Natchez, Mississippi, 1940 (198 killed); and Southgate, Kentucky, 1977 (175 
killed). Elizabeth Mehren & Stephen Braun, Rhode Island Nightclub Fire Toll Nears 
100; Band's Pryotechnics Ignite a Life-or-Death Rush for the Exits, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 22, 
2003, at 1. For a history of nightclub fires in America, and how strict enforcement and 
building codes have reduced the yearly number of nightclub fires from 1,369 in 1980 to 
510 in 1998, see id. The worst single-building fire in American history killed 600 at the 
Chicago Iroquois Theater in 1903 when the stage curtains ignited. This is the subject of 
a book by Tony Hatch entitled TINDER Box. Sean D. Hamill, "Tinder Box" Author 
Notes Tragic Parallel to Club Deaths, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 4, 2003, at 1. The Ringling Bros. 
and Barnum & Bailey tent fire of 1944 in Hartford killed 168. Raja Mishra, Hartford 
Group-Home Fire Kills 10, Dozens of Disabled, Aged Patients Led to Safety, 23 Hurt, 
BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 27, 2003, at B-1. 
4. Dave Wedge & Jessica Heslam, Station Pyro Passed Muster in Past, BOSTON 
HERALD, Mar. 5, 2003, at 1; Michael Powell, R.l. Inspector Never Cited Foam; Club 
Where 98 Died in Fire Used Flammable Soundproofing , WASH. POST, Mar. 4, 2003, at 
A-2. 
5. The Act, which became effective on November 2, 2002, provides: "The amend­
ments made by subsection (b) [adding 28 U.S.C.S. §§ 1369,1697, and 1785, and amend­
243 
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the Multidistrict, Multiparty, Multiforum Jurisdiction Act of 2002. 
As the band started its first number at 11:00 p.m. before a packed 
audience, estimated at 380 people, their pyrotechnics ignited foam 
sound insulation on the walls and ceiling.6 The fire spread rapidly, 
creating an inferno within three minutes.? The lights went out, and 
in the panic, many could not escape.s One hundred people have 
died,9 nearly one hundred ninety were injured, some twenty criti­
cally.lO A WPRI cameraman, Brian Butlerll recording what he 
thought was going to be a concert, kept the camera rolling as he 
backed out of the hall, catching the fire's start, its rapid spread, and 
the victims' struggling to escape. The pictures were broadcast 
widely, and the fire was national news.12 There is no way of over­
stating the impact this tragedy has had on the people of a small 
state like Rhode Island.13 
A disaster's effects ripple through a community, starting at the 
core with the seriously injured and relatives of the deceased, and 
moving in concentric circles through survivors who were exposed 
to the disaster, to extended family members and rescue and re­
ing 28 USCS §§ 1391 and 1441] shall apply to a civil action if the accident giving rise to 
the cause of action occurred on or after the 90th day after the date of the enactment of 
this Act." P.L. 107-273, § 11020(c), 116 Stat. 1829. 
6. Powell, supra note 4. 
7. News reports say smoke filled the building within twenty to thirty seconds, and 
within three minutes, the whole interior was ablaze. Mehren & Braun, supra note 3. 
8. An interview from the burn unit in a Rhode Island hospital, describes how the 
floor collapsed as people piled up seven and eight deep, and how a "molten, tarlike 
substance dripped on [a victim] from the ceiling of the burning nightclub as he struggled 
to escape." Mary Duenwald, Tales From a Burn Unit: Agony, Friendship, Healing, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 18,2003, at F-1 (illustrating two of the stories that a jury is likely to hear). 
9. Associated Press, Nightclub Fire Death Toll Rises to 100, CNN.cOM, May 6, 
2003, at http://www.cnn.coml2003IUSlNortheastl05/06/club.fire.ap/. 
10. Dave Wedge, R.l. Fire's Death Toll Hits 99 as Officials Plan Fines in N.J., 
BOSTON HERALD, Mar. 7, 2003, at 2, 2003 WL 3018536. As of March 18, 2003, eleven 
were reported to be still in critical condition, most on heavy sedation and breathing on 
ventilators. Duenwald, supra note 8. 
11. Lynne Duke, The Fire After; Two Brothers Fall into a Side Business-and 
Their Own Public Hell, WASH. POST, Mar. 8, 2003, at C-l. 
12. See, e.g., Michael S. Rosenwald & Jared Stearns, Deaths, Injuries in Fire at 
R.I. Club, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 21, 2003, at A-I; Ariel Sabar, Two Minutes that Seemed 
Like Forever; Great White Fan Relives Terrifying Moments Before Escape from R.I. In­
ferno, BALT. SUN, Feb. 23, 2003, at I-A; Amy Forliti, 85 Die in Club Fire, DESERET 
NEWS, Feb. 21, 2003, at A-I, 2003 WL 11722280; Fatal Fire Erupts at Nightclub Rock 
Show, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 21, 2003, at 16, 2003 WL 13239939. 
13. Some measure of the public response can be found in the outpouring of chari­
table contributions and help and assistance to the victims. The Station Nightclub Disas­
ter-Help, Memorial Services, Benefits, PROVIDENCE J., Mar. 12, 2003, at A-14, 2003 
WL 7058654. 
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covery workers, to health-care providers and school personnel, to 
government officials and affected businesses, to the community 
at large.14 
The Rhode Island Judicial Department, having previous expe­
rience with multiple cases involving asbestos claims and multiple 
claims involving child abuse by clergy, has moved quickly to pre­
pare for the expected litigation. The Rhode Island Judicial Depart­
ment has assigned in advance all cases arising from the fire to a 
respected judge, The Honorable Alice Gibney,15 who previously 
handled several hundred asbestos cases.16 Representative Timothy 
Williamson of the Rhode Island Legislature introduced H. 6148,n 
authorizing the Presiding Judge of the Superior Court to create spe­
cial rules governing The Station fire cases. IS 
In response to the first cases filed March 4, 2003,19 the Rhode 
14. Felice J. Freyer, The Station Nightclub Disaster-Fire's Psychological Pain will 
Test Survivors and Victims' Families for Years, PROVIDENCE J.-BULL., Mar. 19,2003, at 
A-1. The article quotes Brian W. Flynn, Associate Director of the Center for the Stud­
ies of Traumatic Stress, at the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences in 
Bethesda, Md. "He said the West Warwick fire was unique because it struck the unusu­
ally close-knit Rhode Island community, so its reverberations were felt widely." Litiga­
tion does not end the pain. "Unlike a natural disaster, a human-caused event can cause 
people to focus on fixing blame and seeking justice. Litigation, with its slow pace and 
emphasis on how badly the victims' lives were damaged, often makes it hard for them to 
move on." Litigation may solve financial problems, but not psychological ones. "Vic­
tims often have an unrealistic notion of justice," Flynn said. "People believe lots of 
times that if there is successful litigation, their problems will go away." People can win 
their suit but "wake up the next day still having lost what they've lost," he said. Id. 
15. Wedge, supra note 10. This article reports that Judge Gibney was assigned on 
March 5, 2003, the day after the first case was filed. 
16. Jonathan Saltzman, Purchase of Foam at Club is Traced, BOSTON GLOBE, 
Mar. 6, 2003, at B-5, 2003 WL 3383716. 
17. The bill, introduced March 4, 2003, reads: 
Section 1. The General Assembly finds that the interest of those who suffered 
a loss because of death or injury as a result of the tragic fire at The Station in 
West Warwick, Rhode Island on February 20, 2003 can best be served by a 
fair, just, speedy and inexpensive resolution of their claims. Notwithstanding 
any provisions of the law or Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure or Prac­
tice to the contrary, all civil actions for damages as a result of this fire shall be 
filed and heard pursuant to the rules and regulations promulgated by the Pre­
siding Justice of the Superior Court. Provided, however that any rule promul­
gated by the Presiding Justice of Superior Court that repeals or amends any 
law shall require the approval of the General Assembly. Section 2. This act 
shall take effect upon passage. 
H. 6148 (R.I. 2003) (on file with author). 
18. Liz Anderson, The Station Nightclub Disaster-Bill Would Simplify Fire Law­
suits, PROVIDENCE J.-BULL., Mar. 12,2003, at A-12, 2003 WL 7058667. Representative 
Williamson's district includes West Warwick. 
19. Roderiques v. Town of West Warwick, No. PC 03-1084 (R.I. Super. Ct. Mar. 4, 
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Island Bar Association and the Rhode Island Lawyers Association 
issued a joint statement discouraging a rush to litigate: "The news 
that a local attorney has filed suits in this matter at this time is both 
unfortunate and disconcerting. "20 David Curtin, the Rhode Island 
Supreme Court's disciplinary attorney, issued a public warning of 
criminal prosecution for unauthorized practice of law to out-of­
state lawyers who were allegedly offering their services to victims.21 
Judge Gibney also issued a statement, "This is not about speed, but 
rather about thoroughness, fairness, efficiency and consistency in 
administering steadfast justice for all of the parties involved."22 
The judicial process will be working in a charged atmosphere 
tinged with immeasurable grief, sorrow, suffering, and anger to­
wards those deemed responsible, huge medical expenses for some, 
and staggering economic damages. The claims could reportedly to­
tal hundreds of millions of dollars?3 
I. ENTER THE MULTIDISTRICT, MULTIPARTY, MULTIFORUM 

JURISDICTION ACT OF 200224 

As the Rhode Island Judicial Department prepares to invest 
substantial judicial resources to resolve these cases fairly and expe­
ditiously, this new federal act may complicate their efforts. If the 
Act is applied creatively, it could give helpful assistance toward 
resolving these cases ... or it could cause delay. 
The House Judiciary Committee Report,25 dated July 30, 1999, 
shows the Act was in response to a 1998 decision by the United 
States Supreme Court holding that when federal cases were trans­
ferred to a single federal court for discovery under the Multidistrict 
2003), naming fourteen defendants, was filed before the 40-day waiting period expired 
under RI. GEN. LAWS § 45-15-5 (2002) for actions against municipalities. Kingsley v. 
Derderian, No. 03-1171 (R.I. Super. Ct. Mar. 10,2003), names eighteen defendants but 
not the Town of West Warwick. The statute of limitations for wrongful death in Rhode 
Island is three years. RI. GEN. LAWS, § 10-7-2. The statute of limitations is tolled for 
minor plaintiffs until the age of majority, RI. GEN. LAWS, § 9-1-19, but not in wrongful 
death cases. Short v. Flynn, 374 A.2d 787, 790 (1977). 
20. Wedge, supra note 10. 
21. Tracy Breton, The Station Nightclub Disaster-Unscrupulous Lawyers­
Targeting Families, PROVIDENCE J.-BuLL., Mar. 6, 2003, at A-I, 2003 WL 7057906. 
22. Club Owner's Lawyer Reacts to Statements About Foam; Pine says Affidavit 
Backs up Derderians, TURNTOlO.cOM, Mar. 6, 2003, at http://www.turntolO.com/news/ 
2024914/detail.html. 
23. Ralph Ranalli & Christopher Rowland, Real Estate Group Backs Sprinkler 
Bill, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 14, 2003, at B-3, 2003 wL 3385142. 
24. Pub. L. No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758 (2002). 
25. H.R 106-276, 106th Congo (1999). 
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Rules, the receiving court ,could not try the cases, but had to return 
them for trial to the federal courts from which they were trans­
ferred.26 The Act reverses this decision, allowing the court receiv­
ing Multidistrict cases to retain them for trial under certain 
circumstances. It also went well beyond this immediate issue. 
A. Summary of the Act 
The Act changes the laws of federal jurisdiction, removal juris­
diction, venue, service of process, and subpoenas in 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 1369, 1391, 1441, 1697 and 1785. I liken the Act to a vacuum 
cleaner: it can suck up all of the cases arising out of this horrific fire 
regardless of where filed27 and deposit them in federal court in 
Rhode Island.28 Once there, the federal court "shall abstain from 
jurisdiction" if the dispute is primarily local,29 or the federal court 
could keep the cases for determination of liability.30 If there is a 
finding of liability, there is a right to immediate appeal;31 if liability 
is upheld, the federal court then returns the cases "to the State 
court from which it had been removed"32 for a determination of 
damages, but is given discretion to retain the damage issues as 
well.33 
B. The Act Only Requires Minimal Diversity 
The Act creates original jurisdiction in federal court for "any 
civil action" involving "minimal diversity"34 for claims for deaths 
26. Lexecon v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 V.S. 26 (1998) (in­
terpreting 28 V.S.c. § 1407(a), and holding that 28 v.s.c. § 1404(a) did not give au­
thority to the discovery court to transfer the cases to itself, despite a history of self­
assignment). 
27. 28 v.s.c. §§ 1369-1441(d) (2002). Any victim of the accident can intervene, 
even those who could not file originally in federal court, according to § 1369(d). 
28. Section 1369( e) calls for notice to the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litiga­
tion. Because the accident occurred in Rhode Island and many of the victims reside 
there, the proper court to receive the cases would appear to be the Rhode Island Fed­
eral District Court. Venue under § 1391(g) in § 1369 cases is where "any defendant 
resides" or where "a substantial part of the accident giving rise to the actions took 
place." 
29. § 1369(b). 
30. § 1441(e)(2). 
31. § 1441(e)(3). 
32. § 1441(e)(2). 
33. Id. 
34. "[M]inimal diversity exists between adverse parties if any party is a citizen of 
a State and any adverse party is a citizen of another State, a citizen or subject of a 
foreign State, or a foreign State as defined in section 1603(a) of this title." § 1369(c)(1). 
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and injuries and property damage "arising from a single accident"35 
causing at least seventy-five deaths if certain, easily met conditions 
are present.36 Therefore, the statute applies to The Station night­
club tragedy. The fire was caused by an accident,3? it resulted in 
more than seventy-five deaths, there are at least two adverse parties 
from different states: victims resided in states other than Rhode Is­
land, and any two defendants are from different states (for example 
the band members of "Great White" were reportedly residents of 
California, while the owners of The Station reside in Rhode Island). 
The concept of "minimal diversity" comes from the Federal In­
terpleader Act,38 which requires diversity of citizenship between 
any two claimants, regardless of whether additional claimants are 
from the same state. The Supreme Court has concluded that all the 
Constitution requires is minimal diversity and not complete 
diversity.39 
C. 	 The Act Covers Claims for Wrongful Death, Injuries and 
Property Damage 
The statute contains a threshold of at least seventy-five deaths, 
but once that is reached, the statute creates jurisdiction over "any 
civil action . . . between adverse parties that arises from a single 
accident." The term "any civil action" is all-inclusive. It is not 
limited to wrongful death actions. It contains an added limitation 
that an action for property damage may be maintained "only if 
[there is] physical harm" to a "natural person."40 These words 
seem confusing. Here is why. 
The Act as originally proposed applied where twenty-five per­
sons "either died or incurred injury" in the accident, and it also 
35. 	 § 1369(a). 
36. 	 § 1369(a) requires: 
(1) a defendant resides in a State and a substantial part of the accident took 
place in another State or other location, regardless of whether that defendant 
is also a resident of the State where a substantial part of the accident took 
place; (2) any two defendants reside in different States regardless of whether 
such defendants are also residents of the same State or States; or "(3) substan­
tial parts of the accident took place in different States. 
37. The Act defines an accident as "a sudden accident, or a natural event culmi­
nating in an accident, that results in death incurred at a discrete location by at least 75 
natural persons." 28 U.s.c. § 1369(c)(4) (2002). 
38. 	 § 1335. 
39. 	 State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 530 (1967). 
40. 	 § 1369(c)(3). 
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contained a $75,000 amount in controversy41 requirement. It was 
necessary, therefore, to define injury. When the statute finally 
passed, the number was raised to seventy-five, the reference to "or 
incurred injury" was dropped, and the $75,000 amount in contro­
versy provision was dropped. The definition of "injury" remained, 
however, in § 1369(c)(3). However, there was nothing to attach the 
definition to. This much is clear. If Congress intended by this to 
limit the lawsuits to wrongful death only, and not include injuries to 
persons or property, they expertly concealed that intent by includ­
ing a definition of injuries to persons or property. Nor is there any­
thing in the operative language that limits the Act to death cases 
only. Finally, the damages for injuries could well exceed those for 
wrongful death, and if the statute is to have any effect on mass 
torts, all claims must be included, not just some of them. A reme­
dial statute should be given a construction that brings about, rather 
than nullifies, the intended result. The words "any civil action" 
mentioned above supports the argument. Thus, the Act appears to 
cover all cases arising out of The Station nightclub fire. 
D. The Act Contains No Minimum Amount in Controversy 
The Act contains no amount in controversy requirement. As­
suming minimal diversity, any tragedy that takes seventy-five lives 
will be of sufficient moment to warrant the attention of the federal 
courts. This also means that smaller claims (for example, damage 
to a car in the parking lot of The Station nightclub, damage well 
under the $75,000 requirement of the general diversity statute)42 
could be filed in or removed to Federal Court under the Act.43 
There is not even a $500 threshold such as exists in the Federal 
Interpleader Act.44 The intent is to consolidate all claims from the 
accident-literally all claims-in federal court. In this way, the 
sweep of the vacuum cleaner is complete. 
41. § 1369(a) (proposed in 1999 Committee Reports amended and enacted in 
H.R. 2215, 107th Congo (2002), H.R. 106-276 (July 30, 1999)). 
42. Section 1332(a) requires a claim in excess of $75,000, exclusive of interest and 
costs. 
43. The only limitation is contained in the definition of "injury," which is either 
"(A) physical harm to a natural person and (B) physical damage to or destruction of 
tangible property, but only if physical harm described in subparagraph (A) exists." 28 
U.s.c. § 1369(c) (2002). The statute obviously does not require that the person injured 
be the same person who lost property. 
44. § 1335(a). 
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E. 	 The Act Provides for Nationwide Service of Process and of 
Subpoenas 
The Act45 provides for nation-wide service of process and na­
tion-wide subpoena of witnesses.46 In this, the Act is similar to the 
Federal Interpleader Act.47 On a practical level, this means that 
federal courts are not dependent upon the vagaries of state long­
arm statutes to determine whether federal courts have jurisdiction 
over the person. 
F. 	 The Act Allows Any Person with a Claim to Intervene 
The Act provides that "any person with a claim arising from 
the accident ... shall be permitted to intervene."48 The right to 
intervene exists even if the person could not have brought an origi­
nal action under the Act.49 This makes clear the sweeping nature of 
the Act. Once federal jurisdiction attaches, all claims may be adju­
dicated at the same time without restrictions, so long as plaintiffs 
are willing to intervene and defendants are willing to remove or the 
first plaintiffs are willing to file in federal court. 
G. 	 The Act Provides for Broad Removal Jurisdiction in Federal 
Court 
We have seen that § 1369 creates original jurisdiction in federal 
court involving the deaths of "at least 75 natural persons"50 at a 
"discrete location" resulting from an "accident" with "minimal di­
versity between adverse parties." Under § 1369(d), a plaintiff has a 
right to intervene "even if" unable to sue under § 1369 "as an origi­
nal matter." To this the statute adds a broad removal provision. 
45. Section 1697 provides: "When the jurisdiction of the district court is based in 
whole or in part upon section 1369 of this title, process, other than subpoenas, may be 
served at any place within the United States, or anywhere outside the United States if 
otherwise permitted by law." 
46. Section 1 785 provides: 
When the jurisdiction of the district court is based in whole or in part upon 
section 1369 of this title, a subpoena for attendance at a hearing or trial may, if 
authorized by the court upon motion for good cause shown, and upon such 
terms and conditions as the court may impose, be served at any place within 
the United States, or anywhere outside the United States if otherwise permit­
ted by law. 
47. Service of process under § 1335(a) may be against "all claimants" and no geo­
graphical limit is provided. 28 U.S.c. § 2361 (2002). 
48. 	 § 1369(d). 
49. Section 1369(d) reads, "even if that person [the intervenor] could not have 
brought an action in a district court as an original matter." 
50. 	 § 1369(a). 
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Section 1441(d) creates additional removal jurisdiction by bringing 
in cases that "could have been brought" under § 1369 and by nulli­
fying the restrictions on removal in mass tort cases. Specifically, the 
in-state defendant, previously unable in ordinary diversity cases to 
remove,51 is specifically permitted to remove a mass disaster case to 
federal court.52 If the defendant "is a party to an action which is or 
could have been brought" under § 1369, it is removable.53 If the 
action involves the "same accident as the action in State court" it is 
removable, even if the action "could not have been brought in dis­
trict court as an original matter. "54 
Once the action is removed, it can either remain with that fed­
eral court, be transferred to another federal court under the Mul­
tidistrict Litigation Act,55 or be dismissed for inconvenient forum.56 
For example, a state court action arising out of The Station night­
club disaster filed in California against the band Great White could 
be removed from state to federal court and transferred to federal 
court in Rhode Island, or it could be dismissed in California and re­
filed in Rhode Island. 
H. The Act Provides for Liberal Venue Rules 
The Act amended § 1391 of the U.S. Code to provide that an 
action "based upon Section 1369" can be brought where "any de­
fendant resides" or where "a substantial part of the accident giving 
rise to the action took place."57 Venue would be proper in Rhode 
Island, where the accident happened. However, the federal court 
retains the power "to transfer or dismiss an action on the ground of 
51. § 1441(b). 
52. The operative language is: 
Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b) of this section, a defendant in 
a civil action in a State court may remove the action to the district court of the 
United States for the district and division embracing the place where the ac­
tion is pending (A) the action could have been brought in a United States 
district court under section 1369 of this title; or (B) the defendant is a party to 
an action which is or could have been brought, in whole or in part, under 
section 1369 in a United States district court and arises from the same accident 
as the action in State court, even if the action to be removed could not have 
been brought in a district court as an original matter. 
28 u.s.c. § 1441(e)(1) (2002). 
53. § 1441(e)(1)(A). 
54. § 1441(e)(1)(B). 
55. 42 u.s.c. § 14070). 
56. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(e)(2). 
57. § 1391(g). 
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inconvenient forum."58 As stated earlier, this would mean that an 
action filed in California, Massachusetts-or Connecticut or any 
other place where a defendant could be found-could either be 
transferred to Rhode Island, or dismissed and re-filed in Rhode 
Island. 




A. 	 The Act States the Federal Court Shall Abstain from 
Accepting Jurisdiction in Primarily Local Actions 
If a "substantial majority of all plaintiffs are citizens of" Rhode 
Island, if the "primary defendants are also citizens of" Rhode Is­
land, and if the claims are governed primarily by Rhode Island law, 
then the federal court must abstain.59 The Act states, under the 
language "Limitation of Jurisdiction," that the court "shall abstain" 
from hearing an "action described in subsection [1369] (a)" if two 
conditions are met: "(1) the substantial majority of all plaintiffs are 
citizens of a single State of which the primary defendants are also 
citizens; and (2) the claims asserted will be governed primarily by 
the laws of that State."60 This is a critical provision of the Act. 
How does it apply to The Station fire? 
The first condition has two parts: first, that a "substantial ma­
jority of the plaintiffs" be from "a single state." The published lists 
of dead and injured are not complete, final, or officia1.61 The Act 
does not require that those who are deceased be "from a single 
state," only that the "substantial majority of the plaintiffs" be citi­
zens of a single state. It is possible, but by no means certain, that a 
court could conclude that Rhode Island victims predominate. The 
published list of known victims (there may be those who suffered 
slight injuries or property damage who are not listed in the pa­
pers62) show scores of addresses from Massachusetts, many from 
58. 	 § 1441(e)(6). 
59. 	 § 1369(b)(1). 
60. 	 § 1369(b). 
61. 	 The Station Nightclub Disaster-List of the Victims, PROVIDENCE J.-BULL., 
Mar. 7, 2003, at A-12, 2003 WL 7058346. 
62. The American Lung Association of Rhode Island has launched a public cam­
paign to identify concert patrons who breathed toxic fumes, but who may not have 
sought medical treatment. According to Margaret Kane, Executive Director of the As­
sociation, "Some of these conditions don't manifest themselves for weeks or months 
later .... That's why it's important to follow these people." Tom Mooney, Lung Asso
ciation to Screen Fire Victims, PROVIDENCE J.-BULL., Apr. 17,2003. 
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Connecticut, and a few from other states. Rhode Island addresses 
appear to be in the bare majority.63 Whether they are a "substan­
tial majority" will require closer factual inquiry. 
Second, the first condition requires that the "primary defend­
ants" be from the same state as the substantial majority of plaintiffs. 
The only state to which that could apply is Rhode Island. 
Must all of the primary defendants be from Rhode Island, or 
only some of them? The Act doesn't say. It says "primary defend­
ants."64 Are the primary defendants the owners of the nightclub, 
the Town of West Warwick, the building inspectors, the foam sup­
plier, the local radio station, and the local beer distributor? Does it 
include the band Great White? Are the parties who created the 
condition under which the building could burn so rapidly primary 
defendants? Or is the party who lit the spark? Or are both? 
The issue is more than how to classify certain defendants, but 
how to use the Act. True, an argument could be made that the 
primary defendants do not include insurance companies, Clear 
Channel Communications, Inc., the owner of the local radio station, 
or Anheuser-Busch, because their alleged liabilities are derived 
from their relationships to the primary defendants: the Town of 
West Warwick, the local beer distributor, and the local radio sta­
tion. However, it would be difficult to argue that the California 
band Great White-whose fee for this performance was reported to 
be $2,50065-is not among the primary defendants. They started 
the fire. Consequently, it is difficult to argue that the primary de­
fendants are all from Rhode Island. 
Perhaps this is the wrong question. In making a determination 
of who is primary and thus who is secondary, the court should be 
guided by the ultimate question: which system, state or federal, can 
best produce a fair and expeditious result of all of the expected 
litigation, and how best should the Act be implemented? If the an­
swer is federal, then there are arguably enough non-Rhode Island 
primary defendants here to justify a decision to keep the cases in 
federal court and not to abstain. Abstention, after all, requires 
looking not only at the victims, but also at the defendants. Even if a 
substantial majority of victims are from Rhode Island-a conclu­
63. According to the published list of victims, fifty-eight of the one hundred fatal­
ities were Rhode Island residents. The Station Nightclub Disaster-List of the Victims, 
supra note 61. 
64. 28 U.S.c. § 1369(b) (2002). 
65. Wedge & Heslam, supra note 4. 
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sion that appears unlikely if the victim lists are accurate-not all 
the primary defendants appear to be from Rhode Island. 
Turning to the second condition, whether the claims "will be 
governed primarily by the laws of"66 Rhode Island, without know­
ing the legal theories of cases yet to be filed, it is difficult to predict 
whether the cases will be "governed primarily by" state law. How­
ever, two state lawsuits filed multiple causes of action under Rhode 
Island law only.67 Should that pattern hold, then the second condi­
tion that the claims be "governed primarily" by state law would be 
met. But because the two conditions both must be met, if the "pri­
mary defendants" include the California band Great White, 
Anheuser-Busch, American Foam Company, or Clear Channel 
Communications, it is likely that the federal court would not ab­
stain. A third lawsuit was filed under § 1360 in federal court on 
behalf of three Rhode Island plaintiffs.68 This suit names several 
out-of-state plaintiffs and the State of Rhode Island, in addition to 
many of those plaintiffs named in the Kingsley and Roderiques 
state lawsuits. 
B. When Is the Decision to Abstain to Be Made? 
When does the federal court make the decision to abstain? 
The statute, as noted above, does not require for abstention a 
counting of victims, only a counting of "plaintiffs." When is the 
count to be made? It is conceivable that additional cases may not be 
filed for a substantial period of time. Is the court supposed to antic­
ipate that more cases will be filed in making a decision to abstain? 
Or must the court count only the existing plaintiffs? If it is the lat­
ter, then all of the existing plaintiffs in the two cases filed to date 
are from Rhode Island. That would create a skewed interpretation 
of the Act. 
Congress did not provide a time limit. for a court to decline 
jurisdiction. For the Act to work, the court must be given leeway to 
66. § 1369(b). 
67. Kingsley v. Derderian, No. 03-1171 (RI. Super. Ct. Mar. 10, 2003), states 
claims against The Station's owners, the installers of the soundproofing, the managers 
of the pyrotechnics, the members of the band Great White, a beer company, a radio 
station alleged to have sponsored the event, and the manufacturer of the foam. All the 
claims are based on Rhode Island law. Roderiques v. Town of West Warwick, No. PC 
03-1084 (R!. Super. Ct. Mar. 4, 2003), names fourteen defendants, many of which are 
named in Kingsley, and joins the Town of Warwick and the fire inspector. All of the 
claims arise under Rhode Island law. Neither action states federal claims for relief. 
68. Passa v. Derderian, No. 03-148L (D.RI. filed Apr. 22, 2003). This case is 
before Judge Ronald R. Lejueux. 
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wait for additional filings before making the determination. But if 
the court waits on the other plaintiffs to file, then the cases might sit 
in limbo in federal court while the court awaits word as to which of 
the other plaintiffs intend to file an action. Given the Hobson's 
Choice of prematurely declining jurisdiction on the one hand, and 
sitting on the filed or removed cases to see what will develop on the 
other, the better solution may be for the court to make an educated 
guess that those killed or injured will become plaintiffs, and the 
court would then count these potential plaintiffs along with those 
who have filed to determine who is a "plaintiff" for purposes of 
deciding whether to abstain. 
However, that solution has pitfalls, too. The victim lists are 
unofficial, and include the dead and hospitalized, but not all those 
who were injured. And it omits property claims altogether. It is 
impossible from looking at the published lists to determine whether 
Rhode Island victims, who appear on first reading to be in the ma­
jority, would be a "substantial majority" as required by the Act. If 
the burden were to be placed on the parties seeking abstention, 
they may have a difficult burden. Perhaps that is the best a federal 
court could do if a case is removed-deny abstention on the 
grounds that the burden of proof rests with the party seeking ab­
stention, and proceed to take control of the pace of litigation until 
such time as the residences of the victims become more clear. Or, 
alternatively, the federal court, if asked to do so, could take control 
of the litigation before it, finish all discovery, and then look at the 
abstention question. Then, if the rules require abstention, the fed­
eral court would remand to the Rhode Island courts. 
The removal provisions may offer some solution to the absten­
tion issue. The removal provisions of the Act69 require a defendant 
to remove "within 30 days" after becoming a "party." However, 
the Act also allows removal "at a later time with leave of the dis­
trict court." This could be interpreted (perhaps) as allowing the 
federal court to postpone the decision on whether to abstain from 
hearing the cases until a clearer picture emerges of whether a sub­
69. 42 U.S.C. §1441(e)(1) (2002) provides: 
The removal of an action under this subsection shall be made in accordance 
with section 1446 of this title, except that a notice of removal may also be filed 
before trial of the action in State court within 30 days after the date on which 
the defendant first becomes a party to an action under section 1369 in a 
United States district court that arises from the same accident as the action in 
State court, or at a later time with leave of the district court. 
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stantial majority of the plaintiffs and the primary defendants are 
from Rhode Island. 
Ultimately, non-residents of Rhode Island have a right to liti­
gate in federal court, if not under the Act then under general diver­
sity jurisdiction. Non-residents of Rhode Island also have a right to 
remove to federal court, if not under the Act then under the re­
moval statutes generally. A single Connecticut plaintiff can sue 
under diversity in Rhode Island federal court so long as no defend­
ants in that action are from Connecticut. Obviously, the Act cannot 
be construed as denying to plaintiffs the right to sue under general 
diversity or denying to qualified defendants the right to remove 
under the general removal statutes. The power to abstain from 
hearing cases under § 1369 does not extend to a requirement that 
the federal court abstain from hearing cases filed under the general 
diversity or federal question provisions. Given that reality, it may 
be inevitable that The Station fire cases will end up in federal court. 
Even if the court were to abstain under § 1369, it cannot abstain 
under general diversity jurisdiction in § 1331. 
III. THE BIG PIcrURE: THE PRAcrICAL IMPAcr OF 
ApPLICATION OF THE Acr 
A. 	 The Act Exists to Simplify Litigation Which Otherwise May 
Be in Multiple Courts 
We cannot lose sight of the big picture. This Act exists to fulfill 
a need that the previous jurisdictional statutes could not fill. Just as 
the Federal Interpleader Act was created in response70 to an state 
interpleader system that could not reach out-of-state claimants and 
thus forced an insurance company to pay the same debt twice,71 the 
Multidistrict, Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act was in response to 
the impossibility of trying complex cases in an expeditious manner 
before a single court. There are two ways the federal courts can 
assist the Rhode Island judicial system, should they be asked to do 
so. 
First, the Federal Interpleader Act permits a federal court, 
should a defendant petition it, to enjoin disbursements and collec­
tion of judgments in any other court, even before the judgments are 
entered. Under State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v Tashire,72 the fed­
eral courts are permitted under the Federal Interpleader Act to su­
70. Sanders v. Armour Fertilizer Works, 292 U.S. 190, 194 (1934). 
71. N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Dunlevy, 241 U.S. 518 (1916). 
72. 386 U.S. 523 (1967). 
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pervise the ultimate disbursements of funds which may be owed by 
tort defendants to plaintiffs before plaintiffs have reduced their 
claims to judgment. This prevents the first plaintiffs from settling 
or going to trial, and taking the lion's share of a defendant's assets, 
leaving little or nothing for the other victims. 
Second, federal courts may consider dismissing without 
prejudice, rather than transferring to Rhode Island federal court,73 
cases filed in other states (should there be any). If actions are com­
menced in states other than Rhode Island, in state or federal court, 
the Multiforum, Multidistrict Trial Jurisdiction Act allows the fed­
eral court to "transfer" or dismiss for inconvenient forum.14 Typi­
cally a· court will accept the case and transfer to the convenient 
forum, which would undoubtedly be Rhode Island.15 But there are 
important, critical consequences of whether the federal court in a 
non-Rhode Island state dismisses the action, causing the plaintiff to 
file a new action in Rhode Island (assuming the statute of limita­
tions has not run) or if the federal court transfers the case to Rhode 
Island. 
Here is the key concern. It is possible that, after assuming ju­
risdiction over a mass disaster case, and after having all the cases 
consolidated in a single court to determine liability, the federal 
court may be required by the Act to return the cases to state courts 
in which they were filed for trials on the issues of damages, unless 
convenience and justice requires otherwise.16 The exception may 
swallow the rule-which state court? Here is the answer under the 
73. 28 U.S.c. §§ 1404(a) & 1441(e)(6). 
74. "Nothing in this subsection shall restrict the authority of the district court to 
transfer or dismiss an action on the ground of inconvenient forum." § 1441(e)(6). 
75. For example, in an action filed in New York federal court involving the negli­
gent delivery of gasoline causing a warehouse fire in Virginia, the Court ruled that the 
action should not be tried in New York, but rather in Virginia, where the witnesses 
resided and the fire occurred. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 502-03, 512 
(1946). The decision upheld the trial court's dismissal for forum non conveniens. 
76. 28 U.S.c. § 1441(e)(2) provides: 
(2) Whenever an action is removed under this subsection and the district court 
to which it is removed or transferred under section 14070) has made a liability 
determination requiring further proceedings as to damages, the district court 
shall remand the action to the State court from which it had been removed for 
the determination of damages, unless the court finds that, for the convenience 
of parties and witnesses and in the interest of justice, the action should be 
retained for the determination of damages. 
The reference to "section 14070)" is a drafting error; the 1999 version of the Act con­
tained a section 1407(j). See H.R. Rep. No. 106-276, at 2 (1999). The transfer language 
of Act went to another section, by cross reference to "Section 1407" in § 1441(e)(5), but 
the cross reference to "1407(j)" is to a nonexistent section, and it was not corrected. 
258 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25:243 
Act: "The district court shall remand the action to the State court 
from which it had been removed for the determination of dam­
ages."77 So, if actions are brought in Connecticut, Massachusetts, 
and California, and removed under § 1441 and transferred to 
Rhode Island federal court for trial, the federal court is directed by 
the Act to return the cases to the courts from which they were re­
moved for purposes of trial on the issues of damages, again with 
proviso that the federal court can retain the cases for triaL 
This result would disperse all the damage trials for cases not 
filed in Rhode Island among the sending courts. Instead of having 
Judge Alice Gibney in charge of all the damage cases, with the abil­
ity to bring about a global settlement, the cases would be spread, 
some in Rhode Island, some in Connecticut, others in Massachu­
setts, or California. Thus, more delay in reimbursing the victims for 
their damages would occur. 
Consequently, federal courts not in Rhode Island may assist in 
the settlement or trial of these cases (assuming a finding of inconve­
nient forum) by dismissing without prejudice any action filed in any 
states other than the place of the tragedy, rather than by transfer­
ring the cases to Rhode Island. The dismissed cases would then be 
re-filed in Rhode Island. That simple difference would result in all 
damage claims being tried in Rhode Island courts, either state or 
federal, and might decrease delay and increase the chances of 
settlement. 
B. 	 If the Federal Court Were to Retain the Case, and Find 
Liability, the Act Creates a Presumption that the Cases 
Will Be Remanded to State Court for Finding of 
Damages 
Under § 1441(e)(2), if the federal court retains the case, and 
makes "a liability determination requiring further proceedings as to 
damage" the court "shall remand" to the state, unless it finds that 
"for the convenience of parties and witnesses and in the interest of 
justice, the action should be retained for determination of dam­
ages." The standard is a broad one and leaves considerable room 
for judicial discretion. If all litigants in The Station fire cases stay 
out of federal court, the matter is moot. If litigants decide to use 
the federal court, and if the federal court does not decline jurisdic­
tion, how the litigation will look after a determination of liability is 
hard to predict. What can be said at this stage is the language of 
77. 	 § 1441(e)(2). 
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§ 1441(e)(2) creates a presumption that the cases will be returned 
to state court. By severing liability from damages, however, the Act 
may alter the traditional function of judge and jury. Usually, de­
fendants prefer trials on issues of liability only, and plaintiffs prefer 
both issues to be tried together. As a practical matter, the settle­
ment value of a case depends upon both the strength of the evi­
dence on liability and on damages. However, once liability is 
established, the cases may settle more quickly without having to use 
any evidence relating to damages. 
C. 	 The Federal Court's Decision on which Court Tries the Issues 
of Damages is Non-Appealable 
Regardless of how the federal court rules on whether to re­
mand to state court for trial on the issues of damages, the Act states 
the remand decision is not subject to appellate review. "Any deci­
sion," reads the Act, "under this subsection concerning remand for 
the determination of damages shall not be reviewable by appeal or 
otherwise."78 In effect, therefore, the federal trial judge will have 
the first, last, and only word on whether to try damages in federal 
court or remand the damages to state court. The reason should be 
apparent. If the federal court retains a case and tries it on issues of 
liability and then holds a second trial on damages, the parties have 
had their day in court. The same is true if the federal court returns 
the cases to the respective state courts. 
D. 	 The Act Allows an Immediate Appeal of a Finding of 
Liability Before Trial on the Issue of Damages 
Under the Act, if a federal court finds no liability, judgment 
would be entered accordingly and be subject to appeal in the ordi­
nary course. If a federal court finds liability, then the Act allows an 
immediate appeal before a trial on the issue of damages.79 The Act 
allows only one appeal on the issue of liability.8o 
By creating an appeal between the liability and damages por­
78. 	 § 1441( e)( 4) (2003). 
79. Section 1441(e)(3) provides: 

An appeal with respect to the liability determination of the district court may 

be taken during that 60-day period to the court of appeals with appellate juris­

diction over the district court. In the event a party files such an appeal, the 

remand shall not be effective until the appeal has been finally disposed of. 

Once the remand has become effective, the liability determination shall not be 

subject to further review by appeal or otherwise. 

80. 	 28 U.S.c. § 1441(e)(3). 
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tion of the case, the statute creates a potential for delay. Settling a 
case on appeal may be easier if there is a jury verdict on damages, 
because each side can estimate their risk of loss in real dollars. 
However, if a defendant loses on the liability question, an appeal 
would not be unexpected. The Act permits this appeal sooner 
rather than later, but not twice. Both judicial systems, state and 
federal, have a stake in handling these cases in an expeditious man­
ner. As experienced lawyers know, most cases settle, and perhaps 
the best force for settlement is the trial judge's words, "Call your 
first witness." The Act has the potential to hasten that day, and 
thus hasten the settlement of many of the anticipated cases. 
E. 	 What if All Plaintiffs and All Defendants in an Action Wish 
to Remain in Rhode Island State Court? 
There are two roads to federal court: 1) original jurisdiction 
under § 1369 (or § 1331) and 2) removal jurisdiction under § 144l. 
If, for example twenty-five plaintiffs sue in state court, and all the 
defendants in that case are satisfied with that forum, and take no 
steps to remove, the twenty-five cases remain in state court. There 
is nothing automatic about these rules; they are not self-executing. 
If both sides in an action arising out of The Station fire wish to 
remain in state court, they will. The Act allows plaintiffs to force 
unwilling defendants into federal court; the Act allows defendants 
to force unwilling plaintiffs into federal court. But if both sides to 
an action, plaintiffs and defendants choose state court, who can ob­
ject? There appears to be no mechanism under the Act. Essen­
tially, the Act does not give to federal courts exclusive jurisdiction 
over mass torts; it gives concurrent jurisdiction. 
CONCLUSION 
This article is highly tentative and meant to generate a 
thoughtful approach to the Act. The impulse for the article is to 
help the judicial process, in the face of this tragedy, to bring the 
cases to a just conclusion. 
Without the Act, most cases would be in state court, while a 
few might be in federal court. There would be little uncertainty as 
to which court would hear the cases. Before the Act went into ef­
fect on February 2, 2003, in-state defendants in a mass tort could 
not remove, and Rhode Island plaintiffs could not sue Rhode Island 
defendants under the general diversity statute. 
With the Act, once any plaintiff or any defendant invokes it, 
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then federal jurisdiction may well be inevitable. The likelihood that 
the Act applies is substantial, and even if a court were to abstain 
under the Act, which does not appear likely, the Act does not nul­
lify the existing rights of plaintiffs, if they so choose, (assuming 
complete diversity) to litigate in federal court. Litigation in federal 
court without the Act increases the risk of increased cost and delay. 
Therefore, litigation with the Act is a preferable outcome. The 
choice may not be federal court under the Act versus state court. 
The choice may well be federal court under the Act versus federal 
court under general diversity statutes. However, if no party 
chooses to litigate in federal court, the cases will remain in state 
court. 
The Rhode Island judiciary is preparing, as it must, for an on­
slaught of cases, without knowing in which court-state or fed­
eral-the cases may ultimately be heard. The Station fire cases will 
be litigated in a sea of uncertainty and sadness. Will defendants 
remove? Will plaintiffs choose federal court? Will plaintiffs sue 
outside of Rhode Island? Will the federal courts abstain? Are the 
Rhode Island victims a "substantial majority"? Are victims "plain­
tiffs" before they sue? Who are the "primary defendants"? Will a 
federal court try the issues of liability, and if so, damages as well? 
The Act has great potential for expediting The Station fire 
cases. The object of the Act is to place all of the cases from a mass 
disaster before a single judge, who can supervise discovery, then try 
the issue of liability, and either try or remand the issue of damages. 
How this new procedural tool will function is uncertain. The Act 
consolidates the power in one court to either urge the parties to 
accept a global settlement, or send the unresolved cases to trial. 
There are many unanswered questions. It is up to judges and law­
yers to make the statute work within the structures of the American 
system of litigation. Whether the trial judge will be a federal judge 
in Rhode Island or Judge Gibney or both remains to be seen. Let's 
hope the system will create some alternative procedures to bring 
these cases to a satisfactory solution. 
